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Prohibiting ‘abusers’ from entering the common
home
Although section 7(1)(c) and 7(2)3 of the DVA
provides that magistrates may grant an order that
prohibits the respondent from entering his/her
residence that is shared with the complainant – or a
part of that residence – magistrates are reluctant to
enforce this provision. Many believe that this
decision, when the respondent is legally entitled by
ownership or tenancy to occupy the home, is an
extremely sensitive one. Some magistrates argue
that it is tantamount to eviction, which is the
jurisdiction of the High Court. 
Although the Act refers specifically to “prohibiting
entry into a shared residence”, there is some debate
as to whether this prohibition results in the actual
removal of the respondent or a temporary restriction
from entering the residence. Opinions about
removal vary greatly among magistrates, who raise
the following important questions about the
enforcement of this provision:
• Does section 7 of the DVA specifically intend to 
give the right to remove or temporarily evict the
respondent from the shared residence?
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The second in a series of articles on the Domestic Violence Act considers some of the most difficult issues that
magistrates must decide on. These include the temporary removal of the ‘abuser’ from the common home,
emergency monetary relief for ‘victims’, and orders specifying the terms of contact with children. Magistrates’
opinions on these controversial issues vary greatly, with the result that victims get uneven assistance from the
courts. Magistrates, however, argue that the variation of opinion reflects their independence and discretion, as
well as the various capacities of the lower courts to implement the Act.
In the first part of the series on magistrates andthe Domestic Violence Act (DVA), magistrates’opinions about the general substance and
workability of the Act were discussed (see SA Crime
Quarterly No. 7, March 2004). The second part of
the series considers magistrates’ interpretation of
more controversial issues such as the temporary
removal of the abusers (‘respondents’) from the
common home, emergency monetary relief, and
orders specifying the terms of contact with
children.2
These issues have been described as the most
difficult ones for magistrates to decide upon. The
complexity of granting orders that prohibit an
abuser’s access to his or her residence and/or
children, and the obvious problems associated with
forcing the respondent to pay for the victim’s
(‘complainants’) expenses, is not to be
underestimated for lower court magistrates. The
variation of opinion does not necessarily imply
‘division within the ranks’, however. It may instead
reflect the variety of cases brought before individual
courts, and the varying capacities of the lower
courts to implement the Act. 
period between the granting of the interim order and
the finalisation of the final order can be a highly
dangerous one for complainants. 
Respondents are generally only prohibited from
entering the shared residence for a temporary period,
until the complainant and respondent agree on the
living conditions or until the complainant applies for
a formal order to remove the respondent through the
High Court. 
An exception to this approach is when the court
establishes that the violence was of a ‘serious nature’
and thus warrants the immediate removal of the
respondent. Factors that help the application for
immediate removal of the respondent include
evidence of acts of domestic violence against
children and other vulnerable family members, and
the existence of criminal charges against the
respondent. 
Magistrates, however, are cautious about granting
restrictive conditions prohibiting respondents from
entering areas surrounding the home and other
‘common’ sites frequented by both parties. Such sites
may include places of employment, schools and
other family homes. They argue that it is difficult to
enforce, particularly in communities where living
conditions are crowded. Magistrates do nevertheless
acknowledge that concerns about depriving
respondents of their right to occupy the shared
residence, except under “extreme circumstances”,
also deny the right of complainants and their
children to live in their own homes without violence.  
Emergency monetary relief
The Act makes provision for the granting of
emergency monetary relief (EMR) which is defined
as:
the compensation for monetary losses
suffered by the complainant at the time of the
issue of a protection order as a result of
domestic violence, including:
a) loss of earnings;
b) medical and dental expenses;
c) relocation and accommodation 
expenses; or
d) household necessities.6
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• Does section 7 apply to situations in which the 
respondent has full legal rights to his/her property
and therefore full legal rights to occupy the
home?
• Should section 7 be applied as an ‘exclusion’ or 
eviction order?
• If section 7 can be applied in the same manner 
as an eviction order, at what stage of the
proceedings should it be applied? (Is it fair to
grant this condition at the interim stage, when the
proceedings are ex parte?)4
• If section 7 can be applied in the same manner 
as an eviction order, should this condition only
be granted on the Return Date5 when the
respondent can have an opportunity to respond to
the allegations of violence? 
• Should the prohibition of entry into the shared 
residence be a temporary measure until formal
proceedings are conducted in the High Court to
establish permanent removal or eviction from the
residence?
• If the DVA gives magistrates the power to 
prohibit entry into the shared residence for an
extended period of time, does the order have the
same legal standing as a High Court eviction
order?
Some magistrates argue that they will only grant this
remedy when the respondent is present to argue his
or her side of the case. Others say this approach is
incorrect as the Act does not specify at which stage
the prohibition may be granted. 
The general approach to section 7, however, is to
prohibit the respondent from entering the shared
residence only at the final stage of the protection
order. However, when magistrates believe that
complainants are in serious danger of further abuse,
the condition will be granted at the interim stage. 
But what constitutes ‘serious danger’ may not be
compatible with the complainant’s real or perceived
vulnerability to further violence. Indeed, the
consequences of not thoroughly examining the extent
of vulnerability to further violence can have harmful
effects on the complainant and her dependents. If
Return Dates are set months away, or are postponed
due to the fact that the notice to the respondent to
appear on the Return Date is not properly served, the
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The intention of the Act is to allow complainants
access to emergency funds to ensure that they can
provide for their immediate safety and well-being,
and that of their dependents. Magistrates stated that
some complainants have interpreted this relief as a
substitute for maintenance payments, and found
some of the requests “unreasonable”. The Act,
however, is careful not to use the term maintenance
to describe this remedy. 
Magistrates suggested that some complainants use
the Domestic Violence Act when the maintenance
system fails them – either when they have been
unsuccessful in securing a maintenance order or
when they have waited a long time for the
maintenance order to be served, granted or varied.
As expected, there were a range of opinions
surrounding both the purpose and application of
EMR.
On the one end of the continuum are magistrates
who believe that respondents who are not
maintaining their families or the shared residence –
as required by the law – are committing what the
Act refers to as economic abuse. Referring to
sections 1(ix)(a) and (b) of the Act,7 it would follow
that defaulting on maintenance, not paying monthly
rent or mortgage payments, and not providing for
basic family necessities would all constitute
‘economic abuse’ and therefore warrant EMR. 
Some magistrates suggested that it was perfectly
acceptable for the court to provide the complainant
with EMR for a temporary period, while the lengthy
waiting periods for the appearance of maintenance
defaulters in maintenance courts were pending. The
Act is clear that a protection order may be granted if
there is evidence of any act of domestic violence,
including economic abuse. One magistrate
defended this position:
We are all well aware of the huge delays
experienced by maintenance courts.
Maintenance hearings are set down months in
advance and the courts sometimes have to send
the sheriff out three or four times before he
receives his summons to appear. This is the case
for both new applications, defaulting
respondents and for variations of maintenance
orders. Some women wait for over a year to get
their first maintenance payment. How long do
their children have to go without proper food,
without school because fees are not paid,
without medical care? The maintenance system
is a mess and fathers know it. They use the
delays to avoid supporting their families. The
DVA is clear, it is an immediate and effective
remedy. The one part of justice can help the
other. If the defaulter ends up double-paying
because of back payments, that’s his problem.
He should have obeyed the maintenance order
in the first place. Really, the maintenance court
can take the amount of EMR off the payments of
maintenance. I would consider that a fair
judgment. It provides the applicant with
immediate funds and it means he doesn’t have
to pay twice.
This view, however, was not shared by other
magistrates who considered maintenance a
completely separate issue that should be
contemplated in the maintenance courts. The idea
that EMR could potentially provide the complainant
with ‘bridging’ funds until the maintenance matters
were settled, was not viewed favourably. 
Instead, the allocation of EMR, it was suggested,
should only cover expenses that are a “direct result
of domestic violence”. This, however, implies that
economic abuse is not a ‘real’ form of domestic
violence and that provision for EMR should only be
made when other more ‘serious’ forms of violence
are committed by the respondent. 
It was further suggested that EMR should cover very
specific costs associated with domestic violence,
such as relocation expenses, payments for rental or
bond, medical costs incurred due to the acts of
physical domestic violence and other immediate
living costs incurred by the complainant as a result
of violence. The latter was not adequately defined
in the discussions with magistrates.
There was very little consensus about what to
provide complainants in terms of EMR. However,
magistrates were in agreement that the amount
granted should be fixed – in one lump sum or for a
limited monthly period – and that the courts should
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favourable approach is to refer these matters to the
Children’s Court or the High Court. 
One argument was that granting a no-contact or a
supervised-contact order at the interim protection
order stage was unfair to the responding party. The
interim order, being an ex parte order, takes away the
respondent’s fundamental right to have access to
his/her children – an issue that should be the purview
of the Children’s Court or the High Court. It was
suggested that contact orders with children should
only be granted at the finalisation of the protection
order, when the respondent could argue his or her
position. 
It was further suggested that when a High Court order
is in place, the Magistrate’s Court must not grant an
order that contradicts the order already in place.
When a High Court order has granted particular
custodial or access rights to the children, the
Magistrate’s Court is not in a position to vary the
conditions of the order, even though the DVA makes
provision for the protection of children either by the
removal of the respondent or a regulated ‘contact’
agreement between the parties.
It was counter-argued, however, that the purpose of
the interim protection order was to provide
immediate relief to the complainant until the return
date. When the magistrate is convinced that an “act
of domestic violence” has taken place, his or her
duty is to ensure the protection of the complainant
and her dependants. Limiting the granting of contact
orders to the finalisation stage therefore defeats the
objective of protecting complainants from imminent
danger. 
It was widely accepted that approaching the police
or the courts for protection was one of the most
dangerous periods for the escalation of domestic
violence and, on this basis, every available remedy
provided for in the Act should be made available. It
was also forcefully argued that the act of domestic
violence does not have to be committed solely on the
complainant, but that the court should also protect
children from the damaging effects of this violence. 
When there are existing High Court orders, it was
recommended that magistrates should have the
inform the complainant that they may apply for
maintenance at the maintenance court.  
Contact orders with children
In terms of section 7(6) of the Domestic Violence
Act, if the court is satisfied that it is in the best
interests of the child, it may:
a) refuse the respondent contact with such a 
child; or
b) order contact with such child on such 
conditions as it may consider appropriate. 
Contact orders for children were raised as another
serious issue facing magistrates. The ambiguity and
the variety of approaches used by magistrates in
relation to orders which specify extent of contact
that the respondent has with children, was notable
during all phases of this study. The First Report
found that between 10-50% of requests for
supervised contact with children (in the research
sample) were refused by magistrates. When
conditions of contact were granted (in s. 3.1.2.8 of
Form 4 of the application), the following conditions
were ordered: 
• that the respondent not remove the child 
without the complainant’s consent;
• that the respondent not come within a certain 
distance of the child;
• that the respondent not visit the child at 
school/crèche/day mother; or
• that the respondent not contact the child in any 
way, including telephonically.
Granting both interim and final protection orders
that limit the respondent’s contact with his/her
children is a complex and contentious issue for the
magistracy. The approach to non-contact or
supervised contact orders has been a cautious one
but some courts are more willing to entertain
contact orders than others. 
Magistrates are acutely aware that the decision to
limit contact with children is serious, and that the
manner in which application forms are currently
filled out does not provide the court with sufficient
information to make such a weighty decision. As a
result, magistrates tend not to use the Domestic
Violence Act to establish temporary ‘custody’ of, or
‘access’ to children, and feel that the more
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 8 JUNE 2004 29ARTZ
power to grant immediate relief to a complainant
until such time that an alteration is made to the High
Court order. Magistrates felt strongly that even
though, in principle, High Court orders should be
varied at the High Court, the Domestic Violence Act
should provide a victim of domestic violence with
some temporary relief.  
Some insisted that when the original High Court
order was issued, domestic violence may not have
featured in the decision to grant the order. The
Domestic Violence Act specifically provides for
immediate relief to victims of domestic violence, and
on this basis, magistrates argued that they should
have the power to intervene in cases in which
violence is present and to provide relief to applicants
until such orders can be varied in High Court. 
The court records that were analysed for the First
Report showed that violence against women had
considerable effects on children. Some of the effects
of witnessing domestic violence on children
included:
• insomnia/restlessness;
• acute anxiety;
• diarrhoea and vomiting;
• abdominal pain;
• eating problems (such as not eating or excessive 
eating);
• notable problems at school when violence 
intensified (i.e. poor performance or troubles 
with teachers or peers);
• depression/sadness;
• bed-wetting;
• running away from home/staying with other 
family members/refusing to come home;
• poor general health (chronic cold or flu 
symptoms; exhaustion); and
• increasingly aggressive behaviour/discipline 
problems.
The report also argued that the magistrates presiding
over domestic violence cases should request a report
from a social worker on the child. One magistrate
suggested that with respect to children as applicants
or dependents of the protection order:
We need permanent social workers at court
dealing with domestic violence cases. In fact,
we need a special domestic violence court,
or at minimum we need to legislate a social
workers report, which must be attached to
the application. High court won’t deal with
access/custody issues regarding children
without a social worker’s report, surely the
same should happen in the case of lower
courts who are also expected to address
these issues through this legislation.  
Recommendations regarding the child (as
an applicant for a protection order) and in
terms of the placement of children:
• If a child applies to the court for a 
protection order, the court must consider
the application, and if it deems fit, grant
an interim protection order. The court
must then, if it finds the child to be in
need of care, refer the child to the
Children’s Court in terms of section
11(1)(c) of the Child Care Act.
• When adult applicants request, as part of 
the protection order, an order for the
placement of children (i.e. structured or
specific visits), the magistrate should
inform the applicant that the
arrangement is a temporary one. When
making provision for the placement of
children, magistrates must consider:
- the safety, health and well-being of the 
applicant, child/children or any other
person affected by the domestic
violence;
- the applicant’s perceived risk of further 
harm or violence;
- the personal and material interests of 
the applicant; and
- the best interests of the child/children.
Like the concerns surrounding the prohibition of
respondents from entering the shared residence,
magistrates are cautious about making decisions
that may appear to be the purview of the High
Courts. The development of guidelines for presiding
over cases that involve contact orders with children
must be compatible with a number of other legal
not be finalised, in whole or in part, the order may be
set aside (cancelled) or varied (changed).
6 Section 1(x)(a).
7 Sections 1(ix)(a) and (b) define economic abuse as: 
(a) the unreasonable deprivation of economic or
financial resources to which a complainant is entitled
under law or which the complainant requires out of
necessity, including household necessities for the
complainant, and mortgage or bond repayments or
payment of rent in respect of the shared residence; or
(b) the unreasonable disposal of household effects or
other property in which the complainant has an
interest.
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instruments, namely the Child Care Act, remedies
available through the High Court for the custody
and access of children, and the forthcoming
Children’s Bill. Since the latter has not been
finalised, magistrates felt that decisions relating to
contact with children can only be decided on the
facts presented before them, and what is currently
set out in the Act itself.
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1 Sections of this article were originally published as L 
Artz, Magistrates and the Domestic Violence Act:
Issues of Interpretation, Institute of Criminology,
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approaches by magistrates in implementing the Act.
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Gender Directorate of the Department of Justice and
the author.
3 7(1) The court may, by means of a protection order 
referred to in section 5 or 6, prohibit the respondent
from:
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and the respondent: provided that the court may
impose this prohibition only if it appears to be in the
best interests of the complainant.
7(2) The court may impose any additional conditions
which it deems reasonably necessary to protect and
provide for the safety, health or wellbeing of the
complainant …
4 Ex parte, refers to court proceedings where the 
respondent is not in attendance and decisions are
made in absence of the respondent. Decisions made
at ex parte hearings are only enforceable until the
Return Date, when both the applicant and the
respondent appear before the magistrate.
5 Return Date is the date set by court, once an interim 
protection order has been granted, when both the
applicant and respondent appear before the
magistrate. The magistrate may finalise the protection
order on the return date, or should the respondent
provide reasons for why the protection order should
